Search Results - subject:"Assignment Games"

Set-valued cooperative games with fuzzy payoffs. The fuzzy assignment game

Monroy, L.; Hinojosa, M.A.; Mármol, A.M.; Fernández, F.R. - In: European Journal of Operational Research 225 (2013) 1, pp. 85-90

allocations through the analysis of assignment games with uncertain profits. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011052449

Analysis of the core of multisided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets

Tejada, Oriol - In: TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of … 21 (2013) 1, pp. 189-205

We introduce the class of multisided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games which generalizes the well-known two-sided Böhm …-Bawerk assignment games to markets with an arbitrary number of sectors. We reach the core and the corresponding extreme allocations of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010995410

Assignment Situations with Multiple Ownership and their Games

Norde, Henk; Miquel, S.; van Velzen, S.; Hamers, H.J.M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2005

object is owned by a different agent, Shapley and Shubik (1972) introduced a class of assignment games arising from these … simple assignment games and relaxations that arise from assignment situations with multiple ownership.First, necessary and ….Second, balancedness results are obtained for relaxations of simple assignment games. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090430

The nucleolus and the core-center of multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets

Tejada, Oriol; Núñez, Marina - In: Computational Statistics 75 (2012) 2, pp. 199-220

We prove that both the nucleolus and the core-center, i.e., the mass center of the core, of an m-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment market can be respectively computed from the nucleolus and the core-center of a convex game defined on the set of m sectors. What is more, in the calculus of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010847605

The nucleolus and the core-center of multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets

Tejada, Oriol; Núñez, Marina - In: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 75 (2012) 2, pp. 199-220

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010999651

An axiomatization of the nucleolus of the assignment game

Llerena, Francesc; Nunez, Marina; Rafels, Carles - Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, Universitat de Barcelona - 2012

On the domain of two-sided assignment markets, the nucleolus is axiomatized as the unique solution that satisfies derived consistency (Owen, 1992) and complaint mono- tonicity on sectors size. As a consequence, we obtain a geometric characterization of the nucleolus by means of a strong form of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010593239

Harsanyi Power Solutions for Graph-restricted Games

van den Brink, René; van der Laan, Gerard; Pruzhansky, … - 2004

A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff distributions (possibly empty or consisting of a unique element) to every...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325275

Harsanyi Power Solutions for Graph-restricted Games

Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Pruzhansky, … - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005209512

Harsanyi Power Solutions for Graph-restricted Games

Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Pruzhansky, … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'International Journal of Game Theory', 40, 87-110.<P> A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for...</p>

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255491

Harsanyi power solutions for graph-restricted games

Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Pruzhansky, … - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011338005