We introduce a new model for two-sided markets that generalizes stable marriages as well as assignment games. Our model is a further generalization of the model introduced by Eriksson and Karlander [2]. We prove that the core of our model is always non-empty by providing an algorithm that...

Given an assignment market, we introduce a set of vectors, one for each possible ordering on the player set, which we name the max-payoff vectors. Each one of these vectors is obtained recursively only making use of the assignment matrix. Those max-payoff vectors that are efficient turn up to...

This paper develops a Trade Network Game (TNG) that combines evolutionary game play with endogenous partner selection. Resource-constrained buyers and sellers choose and refuse trade partners on the basis of continually updated expected payoffs. Partner selection takes place in accordance with a...

This paper develops a Trade Network Game (TNG) that combines evolutionary game play with endogenous partner selection. Resource- constrained buyers and sellers choose and refuse trade partners on the basis of continually updated expected payoffs. Partner selection takes place in accordance with...