We study the emergence of strategic behavior in double auctions with an equal number n of buyers and sellers, under the distinct assumptions that orders are cleared simultaneously or asynchronously. The evolution of strategic behavior is modeled as a learning process driven by a genetic...

The random priority (random serial dictatorship) mechanism is a common method for assigning objects to individuals. The mechanism is easy to implement and strategy-proof. However this mechanism is inefficient, as the agents may be made all better off by another mechanism that increases their...

We suggest a new one-parameter family of solidarity values for TU-games. The members of this class are distinguished by the type of player whose removal from a game does not affect the remaining players’ payoffs. While the Shapley value and the equal division value are the boundary members of...

We extend the theory of penalty functions to stochastic programming problems with nonlinear inequality constraints dependent on a random vector with known distribution. We show that the problems with penalty objective, penalty constraints and chance constraints are asymptotically equivalent...

We extend the theory of penalty functions to stochastic programming problems with nonlinear inequality constraints dependent on a random vector with known distribution. We show that the problems with penalty objective, penalty constraints and chance constraints are asymptotically equivalent...

We study the emergence of strategic behavior in double auctions with an equal number of buyers and sellers, under the distinct assumptions that orders are cleared simultaneously or asynchronously. The evolution of strategic behavior is modeled as a learning process driven by a genetic algorithm....