We analyze the social and private learning at the symmetric equilibria of a queueing game with strategic experimentation. An infinite sequence of agents arrive at a server which processes them at an unknown rate. The number of agents served at each date is either: a geometric random variable in...

We analyze the social and private learning at the symmetric equilibria of a queueing game with strategic experimentation. An infinite sequence of agents arrive at a server which processes them at an unknown rate. The number of agents served at each date is either: a geometric random variable in...

We study mediated many-to-many matching in markets in which valuations evolve over time as the result of shocks, learning through experimentation, or a preference for variety. The analysis uncovers the key tradeoffs that platforms face in the design of their matching protocols. It shows that the...

We study mediated many-to-many matching in markets in which valuations evolve over time as the result of shocks, learning through experimentation, or a preference for variety. The analysis uncovers the key tradeoffs that platforms face in the design of their matching protocols. It shows that the...

We consider a bandit problem faced by a team of two heterogeneous players. The team is hierarchical in that one (the principal) retains the exclusive right to terminate the project while the other (the agent) focuses strictly on implementing the project assigned to him. As a key departure, we...

We consider a bandit problem faced by a team of two heterogeneous players. The team is hierarchical in that one (the principal) retains the exclusive right to terminate the project while the other (the agent) focuses strictly on implementing the project assigned to him. As a key departure, we...

This paper designs, evaluates, and tests a tractable priority-index policy for scheduling target updates in a discrete-time multitarget tracking model, which aims to be close to optimal relative to a discounted or average performance objective accounting for tracking-error variance and...

We model new experience goods in the context of dynamic mechanism design. These are goods for which an agent is unsure of her valuation but can learn it through consumption experience. We consider a dynamic environment with a single buyer and seller in which contracting occurs over T periods,...