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  • Search: subject:"Bargaining under Incomplete Information"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Bargaining under Incomplete Information 6 Fairness 6 Hold-Up 6 Incomplete Contracts 6 Signalling 6 Agency theory 2 Austauschtheorie 2 Bargaining theory 2 Gerechtigkeit 2 Incomplete contract 2 Incomplete information 2 Justice 2 Negotiations 2 Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie 2 Rawls's theory of justice 2 Rawls-Gerechtigkeitstheorie 2 Social exchange theory 2 Unvollkommene Information 2 Unvollständiger Vertrag 2 Verhandlungen 2 Verhandlungstheorie 2
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Online availability
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Free 6
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 6
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Working Paper 4 Arbeitspapier 2 Graue Literatur 1 Non-commercial literature 1
Language
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English 5 Undetermined 1
Author
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Siemens, Ferdinand von 5 von Siemens, Ferdinand 1
Institution
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Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 2
Published in...
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Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 1 Discussion Papers in Economics 1 Discussion papers / Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 1 Munich Discussion Paper 1 Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge : VWL ; discussion papers 1 SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 1
Source
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ECONIS (ZBW) 2 EconStor 2 RePEc 2
Showing 1 - 6 of 6
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Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-Up Problem
von Siemens, Ferdinand - 2005
In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation-specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334160
Saved in:
Cover Image
Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-Up Problem
Siemens, Ferdinand von - 2005
In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427428
Saved in:
Cover Image
Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-Up Problem
Siemens, Ferdinand von - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005
In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation-specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785933
Saved in:
Cover Image
Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-Up Problem
Siemens, Ferdinand von - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005
In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005187303
Saved in:
Cover Image
Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem
Siemens, Ferdinand von (contributor) - 2005
Siemens, Ferdinand von: Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-Up Problem Munich Discussion …-Maximilians-Universität München Onlineunter: http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/518/ Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002812571
Saved in:
Cover Image
Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem
Siemens, Ferdinand von - 2005
In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation-specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371083
Saved in:
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