This paper investigates optimal monetary policy in an economy, in which the output-inflation trade off faced by the central bank is influenced by two important forces: (i) the presence of uncertain and possibly changing parameters, and (ii) private sector expectations regarding the central...

The dynamics of a stochastic, two-period principal-agent relationship is studied. The agent's type remains the same over time. Contracts are short term. The principal designs the second contract, taking the information available about the agent after the first period into account. <p>Compared to...</p>

The paper introduces a model of price formation in an economy with a decentralized dealership market for each of the traded securities, in continuous time. Each dealer is a competitive liquidity provider for non-dealer investors in the partial market for the given security. Quotes are in the...

For many environmental problems regulators are uncertain about both the costs of abatement and the stock-related damages. For example, governments have imperfect information about damages caused by greenhouse gas stocks, and also about the costs of abating greenhouse gas emissions. They acquire...

The impact of information dissemination and experimentation on dynamic adverse selection in noisy agency relationships is examined. Significant deviations in terms of equilibrium actions and payments occur, when compared to deterministic environments. Information dissipates slowly, so payments...

We study the evolution of prices set by duopolists who are uncertain about the perceived degree of product differentiation. Customers sometimes view the products as close substitutes, sometimes as highly differentiated. As the informativeness of the quantities sold increases with the price...

We develop a multi-period model of strategic trading in an asset market where traders are uncertain about market liquidity. In our model, informed traders strategically trade against competitive market makers to exploit their short-lived private information. Unlike market makers, informed...