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  • Search: subject:"Bayesian implementability"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Bayesian implementability 5 Core outcomes 5 Vickrey auction 5 competitive equilibrium 5 complements 5 substitutes 5 Asymmetric information 2 Asymmetrische Information 2 Auction theory 2 Auktionstheorie 2 Bayes-Statistik 2 Bayesian inference 2 Core 2 Equilibrium theory 2 Game theory 2 Gleichgewichtstheorie 2 Spieltheorie 2
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Online availability
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Free 4 Undetermined 1
Type of publication
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Article 4 Book / Working Paper 1
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Article in journal 2 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 2 Article 1
Language
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English 3 Undetermined 2
Author
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Goeree, Jacob K. 5 Lien, Yuanchuan 5
Institution
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Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakutät 1
Published in...
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Theoretical Economics 2 IEW - Working Papers 1 Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory 1 Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric Society 1
Source
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ECONIS (ZBW) 2 RePEc 2 EconStor 1
Showing 1 - 5 of 5
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On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions
Goeree, Jacob K.; Lien, Yuanchuan - In: Theoretical Economics 11 (2016) 1, pp. 41-52
When goods are substitutes, the Vickrey outcome is in the core and yields competitive seller revenue. In contrast, with complements, the Vickrey outcome is efficient but not necessarily in the core and revenue can be low. Non-core outcomes may be perceived as unfair since there are bidders...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011599562
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Cover Image
On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions
Goeree, Jacob K.; Lien, Yuanchuan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 1, pp. 41-52
When goods are substitutes, the Vickrey outcome is in the core and yields competitive seller revenue. In contrast, with complements, the Vickrey outcome is efficient but not necessarily in the core and revenue can be low. Non-core outcomes may be perceived as unfair since there are bidders...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011673080
Saved in:
Cover Image
On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions
Goeree, Jacob K.; Lien, Yuanchuan - In: Theoretical Economics (2014)
When goods are substitutes, the Vickrey outcome is in the core and yields competitive seller revenue. In contrast, with complements, the Vickrey outcome is efficient but not necessarily in the core and revenue can be low. Non-core outcomes may be perceived as unfair since there are bidders...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011093702
Saved in:
Cover Image
On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions
Goeree, Jacob K.; Lien, Yuanchuan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 11 (2016) 1, pp. 41-52
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011485608
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Cover Image
On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions
Goeree, Jacob K.; Lien, Yuanchuan - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2009
When goods are substitutes, the Vickrey auction produces efficient, core outcomes that yield competitive seller revenues. In contrast, with complements, the Vickrey outcome, while efficient, is not necessarily in the core and revenue can be very low. Non-core outcomes may be perceived as unfair...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10008558468
Saved in:
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