Search Results - subject:"Bayesian implementation"

A Note on Jackson's Theorems in Bayesian Implementation

Saglam, Ismail - In: Economics Bulletin 3 (2008) 55, pp. 1-8

This note shows that in an incomplete information situation the closure condition will be satisfied by all social choice sets if and only if the set of states of the society which all agents believeoccur with positive probability satisfies the `connection' condition.It then follows from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010629763

A Unified Theory of Implementation

Saglam, Ismail - In: Economics Bulletin 4 (2007) 20, pp. 1-10

This paper unifies the theories of Nash implementation and Bayesian implementation. Environments considered are such …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094826

A Unified Theory of Implementation

Saglam, Ismail - In: Economics Bulletin 4 (2007) 20, pp. 1-10

This paper unifies the theories of Nash implementation and Bayesian implementation. Environments considered are such …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010629863

On the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation : the case of correlated types

Kushnir, Alexey - 2013

We consider general social choice environments with private values and correlated types. Each agent's matrix of conditional probabilities satisfies the full rank condition. We show that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists a dominant strategy incentive compatible...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781889

A sufficient condition for Bayesian implementation with side payments

Kim, Bong-ju - In: The Korean economic review 29 (2013) 2, pp. 429-445

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010232576

A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation

Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Rajiv - School of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study - 2002

We provide a characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation in pure strategies for environments satisfying no … for Bayesian implementation. Virtual monotonicity is weak in the sense that it is generically satisfied in environments … with at least three alternatives. This implies that in most environments virtual Bayesian implementation is as successful …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005163083

A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation

Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Rajiv - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318865

Indescribability and its irrelevance for contractual incompleteness

Kunimoto, Takashi - In: Review of Economic Design 14 (2010) 3, pp. 271-289

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008673879

Implementation Theory

Maskin, Eric; Sjostrom, Tomas - School of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005697959

Generic efficiency and collusion-proofness in exchange economies

GIRAUD, Gaël; ROCHON, Céline - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2001

We define a newstrategic equilibrium concept - called strong collusion-proof contract - designed to characterize stable communication agreements in games with differential information against non-binding, selfenforcing and incentive compatible deviations by coalitions. We then construct a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008671