In the context of a "beauty contest" coordination game (in which pay-offs depend on the proximity of actions to an unobserved state variable and to the average action) players choose how much costly attention to pay to various informative signals; they endogenously select information sources and...

We extend the model of Cornand and Heinemann (2008, Economic Journal) and examine how to implement partial announcement by selling public information when the agents' action is strategic complements. In a game of information acquisition, there exist multiple equilibria and the partial...

We consider implementability and the welfare effects of a partial announcement policy using a model of a beauty contest where agentsf actions are strategic complements and where their decisions on public information acquisition are endogenous. The following results are obtained: i) if the...

We extend the model of Cornand and Heinemann (2008, Economic Journal) and examine how to implement partial announcement by selling public information when the agents' action is strategic complements. In a game of information acquisition, there exist multiple equilibria and the partial...

In a Lucas-Phelps island economy, an island has access to many informative signals about demand conditions. Each signal incorporates both public and private information: the correlation of a signal׳s realizations across the economy determines its publicity. If information sources differ in...