In this note, we generalize the results obtained by Barday and Lesur (2005) by considering a bivariated non separable utility function. We characterize optimal health insurance contracts. Moreover, we show that under moral hazard a sufficiently high risk aversion implies that the optimal...

In this note, we intend to characterize conditions such that adverse selection is irrelevant in health insurance. We show that a condition is that policyholders health status is sufficiently reduced by illness.

This paper extends to bivariate utility functions, Eeckhoudt et al.’s (2009) result for the combination of ‘bad’ and ‘good’. The decision-maker prefers to get some of the ‘good’ and some of the ‘bad’ to taking a chance on all the ‘good’ or all the ‘bad’ where ‘bad’...

In this note, we generalize the results obtained by Barday and Lesur (2005) by considering a bivariated non separable utility function. We characterize optimal health insurance contracts. Moreover, we show that under moral hazard a sufficiently high risk aversion implies that the optimal...