bonus contracts, which builds on a model of attentional focusing. Our main result identifies market conditions under which … bonus contracts should be observed: while a monopolist pays a bonus to consumers - if at all - only for low-value goods …, firms standing in competition always - i.e., independent of the consumers’ valuation - offer bonus contracts. Thus …

bonus contracts, which builds on a model of attentional focusing. Our main result identifies market conditions under which … bonus contracts should be observed: while a monopolist pays a bonus to consumers - if at all - only for low-value goods …, firms standing in competition always - i.e., independent of the consumers' valuation - offer bonus contracts. Thus …

bonus contracts, which builds on a model of attentional focusing. Our main result identifies market conditions under which … bonus contracts should be observed: while a monopolist pays a bonus to consumers, if at all, only for low-value goods, firms … standing in competition always - i.e., independent of the consumers' valuation - offer bonus contracts. Thus, competition does …

bonus contracts, which builds on a model of attentional focusing. Our main result identifies market conditions under which … bonus contracts should be observed: while a monopolist pays a bonus to consumers, if at all, only for low-value goods, firms … standing in competition always - i.e., independent of the consumers' valuation - offer bonus contracts. Thus, competition does …

(it is stopped too early). Second-best remuneration is shown to optimally utilize a menu of simple bonus contracts. In …

(it is stopped too early). Second-best remuneration is shown to optimally utilize a menu of simple bonus contracts. In …

(it is stopped too early). Second-best remuneration is shown to optimally utilize a menu of simple bonus contracts. In …

(it is stopped too early). Second-best remuneration is shown to optimally utilize a menu of simple bonus contracts. In …