We analyze a dynamic durable good oligopoly model where sellers are capacity constrained over the length of the game. Buyers act strategically in the market, knowing that their purchases may affect future prices. The model is examined when there is one and multiple buyers. Sellers choose their...

This dissertation comprises three independent essays that analyze pricing behavior in experimental duopoly markets. The first essay examines whether the content of buyer information and the timing of its dissemination affects seller market power. We construct laboratory markets with...

This paper explores the benefits of letting customers escape from prepurchased service contracts by offering refunds for cancellations. We show that such a policy creates opportunities for in a capacity-constrained service—i.e., collecting cancellation fees from advance buyers who cancel, and...

This chapter provides an overview of the nature of state and federal subsidies to higher education and the empirical evidence on the impacts on students' college enrollment decisions. The discussion includes a brief discussion of the incentives created by federal and state subsidies for...