Voters use the press to keep politicians accountable. By endogenizing the response of the voters, this paper provides a theoretical foundation to disentangle the effects of media regulation on corruption and clarify under which circumstances regulation reduces or increases corruption. The...

Unobserved components (UC) models are widely used to estimate stochastic trends in macroeconomic time series, with the existence of a stochastic trend typically motivated by a stationarity test. However, given the small sample sizes available for most macroeconomic variables, standard Lagrange...

I study a model of political agency where a media firm plays a monitoring role between the electorate and the politician. The analysis focuses on the design of a legal framework for the press such that corruption is minimized. I find that an antidefamation law punishing media that publish false...

We run a series of experiments to compare the well known arbitration scheme FOA (Final Offer Arbitration) with a new arbitration scheme, non compulsory, we proposed in a companion paper (Tanimura and Thoron (2008)): ROC (Recursive Offer Conciliation). The two mechanisms are also compared with a...

This paper explores the role played by press regulation in selecting the information mass media deliver to voters. The focus is on whether press regulation can reduce political corruption and increase voters' welfare. By endogenizing the response of the voters to information from the media, we...