A social welfare function for a denumerable society satisfies {Pairwise Computability} if for each pair (x,y) of alternatives, there exists an algorithm that can decide from any description of each profile on {x,y} whether the society prefers x to y. I prove that if a social welfare function...

The public at large, many policymakers, and a number of economists hold views of social welfare that are non-welfarist, which is to say that some importance is attached to factors other than individuals' utilities. We show, however, that any non-welfarist method of policy assessment violates the...

Punitive damages deter and punish. Using a social welfare function that incorporates both economic efficiency and a desire for retribution, this paper explores the effects of punitive damages in situations of reckless disregard that might be viewed as outrageous. If the defendant was making a...

The notion of keeping distances, introduced by N. Baigent in [2], avoids the need to introduce topological concepts when defining Social Welfare Functions with requirements analogous to those established by Chichilnsky in [3]. In the following study we propose an extension of the results of...

In the very general setting of Armstrong (1980) for Arrow's Theorem, I show two results. First, in an infinite society, Anonymity is inconsistent with Unanimity and Independence if and only if a domain for social welfare functions satisfies a modest condition of richness. While Arrow's axioms...

This paper examines the implementability of social choice functions when only partial verification of private information is possible. Green and Laffont (1986) used this framework to derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the revelation principle to continue to hold with partial...