We consider a tax-funded policy of admitting and integrating asylum seekers in a country in which the incomes of the native inhabitants are differentiated; for the sake of simplicity, we assume that there are just two groups of native inhabitants: high-income natives and low-income natives. As a...

This paper investigates the role of social influences in preferences for redistribution using data from the General Social Survey. We employ social interaction models with a socioeconomic network structure and intertemporal feedbacks during the impressionable years. We find substantial evidence...

I study portfolio sustainability and capital flow dynamics in socially responsible and conventional mutual funds. I document that a large fraction of conventional funds systematically invests sustainably even without a social mandate, while several socially responsible funds persistently...

Imagine a group of individuals facing a binary question whose truth value is logically driven by multiple premises. The group's purpose is to make a correct judgment on the question based on their individual judgments. There are two types of procedures to aggregate individual judgments: The...

We test 494 households participating in the German Socio Economic Panel SOEP to examine risk taking by one household member that affects a second household member. Choices cannot be explained by (short term) strategic behavior. Respect for the risk preference of the counterpart is at best...

A Principal appoints a committee of partially informed experts to choose a policy. The experts' preferences are aligned with each other but conflict with hers. We study whether she gains from banning committee members from communicating or \deliberating" before voting. Our main result is that if...

We develop a model of social preferences for network games and study its predictions in a local public goods game with multiple equilibria. The key feature of our model is that players' social preferences are heterogeneous. This gives room for disagreement between players about the “right”...

We study fairness in economies where humans consume one private good and one public good representing the welfare of other species. We show that a social evaluator cannot be egalitarian with respect to humans while always respecting humans' unanimous preferences. One solution is to respect...

This paper analyzes a non-smooth model of probabilistic voting with two parties and a broad family of other-regarding behavior, including fairness and quasi-maximin preferences, income-dependent altruism, and inequity aversion. The paper provides conditions for equilibrium existence and...

Belief disagreement generates a fundamental tension between two desirable features of a resource allocation: Pareto optimality and risk sharing. While Pareto optimality generally opposes restrictions to trade, a growing literature rejects it in the presence of heterogeneous beliefs and proposes...