neutrality axiom. The agent-Shapley value satisfies player collusion neutrality stating that collusion of two players belonging … collusion neutrality stating that after a collusion of two agents, the sum of their payoffs does not change. After axiomatizing … payoffs over all its players. We provide axiomatic characterizations of these two solutions that differ only in a collusion …

neutrality axiom. The agent-Shapley value satisfies player collusion neutrality stating that collusion of two players belonging … collusion neutrality stating that after a collusion of two agents, the sum of their payoffs does not change. After axiomatizing … payoffs over all its players. We provide axiomatic characterizations of these two solutions that differ only in a collusion …

neutrality axiom. The agent-Shapley value satisfies player collusion neutrality stating that collusion of two players belonging … collusion neutrality stating that after a collusion of two agents, the sum of their payoffs does not change. After axiomatizing … payoffs over all its players. We provide axiomatic characterizations of these two solutions that differ only in a collusion …

satisfies collusion neutrality, while the Myerson value satisfies component efficiency. Requiring both efficiency and collusion … there is no solution for these games that satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality and the null player property. We give … neutrality for cycle-free graph games yields other solutions such as the hierarchical outcomes and the average tree solution …

, collusion neutrality and the null player property. Finally, we show that a solution satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality … use efficiency which is not satisfied by the Banzhaf value. On the other hand, the Banzhaf value satisfies collusion … neutrality which is not satisfied by the Shapley value. Both properties seem desirable. However, neither the Shapley value nor …

satisfies collusion neutrality, while the Myerson value satisfies component efficiency. Requiring both efficiency and collusion … there is no solution for these games that satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality and the null player property. We give … neutrality for cycle-free graph games yields other solutions such as the hierarchical outcomes and the average tree solution …

, collusion neutrality and the null player property. Finally, we show that a solution satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality … use efficiency which is not satisfied by the Banzhaf value. On the other hand, the Banzhaf value satisfies collusion … neutrality which is not satisfied by the Shapley value. Both properties seem desirable. However, neither the Shapley value nor …

satisfies collusion neutrality, while the Myerson value satisfies component efficiency. Requiring both efficiency and collusion … there is no solution for these games that satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality and the null player property. We give … neutrality for cycle-free graph games yields other solutions such as the hierarchical outcomes and the average tree solution …

not satisfied by the Banzhaf value. On the other hand, the Banzhaf value satisfies collusion neutrality which is not … the equal division solution. Further, we show that there is no solution that satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality … and the null player property. Finally, we show that a solution satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality and linearity if …