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  • Search: subject:"Collusive bribery"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Collusive bribery 5 Tax compliance 3 Cartel 2 Corruption 2 Criminal tax law 2 Cross-border tax evasion 2 Exemption from punishment 2 Game theory 2 Institutional economics 2 Institutionenökonomik 2 Institutions 2 Kartell 2 Korruption 2 Law enforcement 2 Leniency 2 Rechtsdurchsetzung 2 Restraints of competition 2 Spieltheorie 2 Spillover 2 Steuerflucht 2 Steuermoral 2 Steuerstrafrecht 2 Steuervermeidung 2 Straffreiheit 2 Tax avoidance 2 Wettbewerbsbeschränkung 2 institutions 2 leniency 2 spillover 2 tax compliance 2 Bonus Leniency 1 Reward 1 asymmetric reporting 1 experiment 1
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Online availability
All
Free 5
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 5
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Working Paper 4 Arbeitspapier 2 Graue Literatur 2 Non-commercial literature 2
Language
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English 4 Undetermined 1
Author
All
Buckenmaier, Johannes 4 Dimant, Eugen 4 Mittone, Luigi 4 Abbink, Klaus 1 Wu, Kevin 1
Institution
All
Department of Econometrics and Business Statistics, Monash Business School 1
Published in...
All
CEDEX discussion paper series 1 CeDEx Discussion Paper Series 1 Monash Economics Working Papers 1 Working Paper 1 Working paper series / University of Zurich, Department of Economics 1
Source
All
ECONIS (ZBW) 2 EconStor 2 RePEc 1
Showing 1 - 5 of 5
Cover Image
Effects of institutional history and leniency on collusive corruption and tax evasion
Buckenmaier, Johannes; Dimant, Eugen; Mittone, Luigi - 2018
We investigate the effects of an institutional mechanism that incentivizes taxpayers to blow the whistle on collusive corruption and tax compliance. We explore this through a formal leniency program. In our experiment, we nest collusive corruption within a tax evasion framework. We not only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011969206
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Cover Image
Effects of institutional history and leniency on collusive corruption and tax evasion
Buckenmaier, Johannes; Dimant, Eugen; Mittone, Luigi - 2018
We investigate the effects of an institutional mechanism that incentivizes taxpayers to blow the whistle on collusive corruption and tax compliance. We explore this through a formal leniency program. In our experiment, we nest collusive corruption within a tax evasion framework. We not only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012029783
Saved in:
Cover Image
Effects of institutional history and leniency on collusive corruption and tax evasion
Buckenmaier, Johannes; Dimant, Eugen; Mittone, Luigi - 2018 - This version: June 5, 2018
We investigate the effects of an institutional mechanism that incentivizes taxpayers to blow the whistle on collusive corruption and tax compliance. We explore this through a formal leniency program. In our experiment, we nest collusive corruption within a tax evasion framework. We not only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011861538
Saved in:
Cover Image
Effects of institutional history and leniency on collusive corruption and tax evasion
Buckenmaier, Johannes; Dimant, Eugen; Mittone, Luigi - 2018 - This version: May, 2018
We investigate the effects of an institutional mechanism that incentivizes taxpayers to blow the whistle on collusive corruption and tax compliance. We explore this through a formal leniency program. In our experiment, we nest collusive corruption within a tax evasion framework. We not only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011894106
Saved in:
Cover Image
Reward Self-Reporting to Deter Corruption: An Experiment on Mitigating Collusive Bribery
Abbink, Klaus; Wu, Kevin - Department of Econometrics and Business Statistics, … - 2013
is weakly effective in reducing collusive bribery where parties expect to engage with one another in future and is a …This paper investigates the effectiveness of offering rewards for self reports as a means of combating collusive … bribery. Rewarding self reporting theoretically sows distrust between parties tempted to exchange bribes and may reduce …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010861707
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