Leaks are pervasive in politics. Hence, many committees that nominally operate under secrecy de facto operate under the threat that information might be passed on to outsiders. We study theoretically and experimentally how this possibility affects the behavior of committee members and the...

We present a novel explanation for the group polarization effect whereby discussion among like-minded individuals induces shifts toward the extreme. Our theory distinguishes between a quantitative policy under debate and the discussion's rhetorical frame, such as the likelihood of an outcome. If...

This paper uses a laboratory experiment to investigate the role of group size in an innovation contest. Subjects compete in a discrete time innovation contest, based on Halac, Kartik, and Liu (2017), where subjects, at the start of each period, are informed of the aggregate number of innovation...

Many situations in the social and economic life are characterized by rivalry and conflict between two or more competing groups. Warfare, socio-political conflicts, political elections, lobbying, and R&D competitions are all examples of inter-group conflicts in which groups spend scarce and...

The governance reforms of 2003 require corporate boards to establish various committees. This paper studies how these committees are structured and the corresponding impacts. I find that independent directors with long tenures and multiple board seats tend to multitask and sit on more...

The Shapley-Shubik index is a specialization of the Shapley value and is widely applied to evaluate the power distribution in committees drawing binary decisions. It was generalized to decisions with more than two levels of approval both in the input and the output. The corresponding games are...

Imagine a group of individuals facing a binary question whose truth value is logically driven by multiple premises. The group's purpose is to make a correct judgment on the question based on their individual judgments. There are two types of procedures to aggregate individual judgments: The...

How is group conflict over a public-good prize affected when individuals are active members of multiple groups simultaneously? To investigate this question, I introduce a simple model of Tullock group contest: individuals are partitioned into two groups in two dimensions each, the group-level...

We analyze a dynamic investment problem where decisions are made through voting within a group of agents with heterogeneous beliefs. We show that disagreement generates inefficient underinvestment---the group rejects projects that are unanimously deemed profitable by each member---and...

A Principal appoints a committee of partially informed experts to choose a policy. The experts' preferences are aligned with each other but conflict with hers. We study whether she gains from banning committee members from communicating or \deliberating" before voting. Our main result is that if...