Search Results - subject:"Committee voting"

Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - 2012

We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is then implemented. We characterize the policies which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010392405

Bargaining over an Endogenous Agenda

Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010568440

Bargaining over an endogenous agenda

Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535532

Mostly sunny : a forecast of tomerrow's power index research

Kurz, Sascha; Maaser, Nicola; Napel, Stefan; Weber, Matthias - In: Homo oeconomicus 32 (2015) 1, pp. 133-146

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011375777

Delayed doves: MPC voting behaviour of externals

Hansen, Stephen; McMahon, Michael - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2008

The use of independent committees for the setting of interest rates, such as the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) at the Bank of England, is quickly becoming the norm in developed economies. In this paper we examine the issue of appointing external members (members who are outside the staff of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746572

Delayed Doves: MPC Voting Behaviour of Externals

Hansen, Stephen; McMahon, Michael F. - Centre for Economic Performance, LSE - 2008

58 and D71 Key Words: Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), Bank of England, Committee Voting, Signalling This paper was … in several recent papers on committee voting (for example Levy (2007) and Meade and Stasavage (2008)). First, academic … structure of the MPC and review previous research in this area. The third section constructs a simple model of ideal committee …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150977

Reciprocity and resistance to comprehensive reform

Fischbacher, Urs; Schudy, Simeon - In: Public Choice 160 (2014) 3, pp. 411-428

Comprehensive reforms often fail, despite being beneficial to society. Politicians may block comprehensive reforms in an attempt to form vote trading coalitions in which they benefit from a piecemeal reform at the expense of others. Because formal commitment devices for vote trading are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010937304

On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences

Öztürk, Murat; Peters, Hans; Storcken, Ton - In: Economic Theory 56 (2014) 1, pp. 83-108

-best points, then there are non-dictatorial strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rules, which can be described by committee voting …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993556

Bargaining over an endogenous agenda

Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 9 (2014) 2, pp. 445-482

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010386045

On the location of public bads : strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences

Öztürk, Murat; Peters, Hans J. M.; Storcken, Ton - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 56 (2014) 1, pp. 83-108

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010344331