We extend Aumann's [3] theorem deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of … rationality by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a …

common knowledge of rationality by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the assumption of common … knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker notion, p-belief of rationality, where agents believe the other agents are …

successfully sent. This has been regarded as a "paradox of almost common knowledge." Binmore and Samuelson (2001) later extended …

Aumann has shown that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event $E$ if … common knowledge that the posteriors for $E$ \emph{do} coincide? We show that a necessary and sufficient condition for this … is the existence of a nonempty \emph{finite} event $F$ with the following two properties. First, it is common knowledge …