Aumann has shown that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event $E$ if … common knowledge that the posteriors for $E$ \emph{do} coincide? We show that a necessary and sufficient condition for this … is the existence of a nonempty \emph{finite} event $F$ with the following two properties. First, it is common knowledge …

that are consistent with common knowledge of rationality and market clearing (henceforth, CKRMC outcomes) in terms of a … with common knowledge of rationality and market clearing even when there is common knowledge that there are no mutual gains …Consider an exchange economy with asymmetric information. What is the set of outcomes that are consistent with common …

We study the effect of stochastically delayed communication on common knowledge acquisition (common learning). If … messages do not report dispatch times, communication prevents common learning under general conditions even if common knowledge …