Search Results - subject:"Common Knowledge"

Half empty, half full and the possibility of agreeing to disagree

Zimper, Alexander - Economic Research Southern Africa (ERSA) - 2007

Aumann (1976) derives his famous we cannot agree to disagree result under the assumption of rational Bayesian learning. Motivated by psychological evidence against this assumption, we develop formal models of optimistically, resp. pessimistically, biased Bayesian learning within the framework of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008594436

Interim correlated rationalizability

Dekel-Tabak, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 2 (2007) 1, pp. 15-40

This paper proposes the solution concept of interim correlated rationalizability, and shows that all types that have the same hierarchies of beliefs have the same set of interim-correlated-rationalizable outcomes. This solution concept characterizes common certainty of rationality in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702628

Topologies on types

Dekel, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Morris, Stephen - 2006

We de.ne and analyze a strategic topology on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a .xed game and action de.ne the distance be-tween a pair of types as the diþerence between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272319

Mutual knowledge of rationality in the electronic mail game

Takamiya, Koji; Tanaka, Akira - 2006

bound order of mutual knowledge of rationality. This result implies that under common knowledge of rationality, the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332403

Topologies on types

Dekel, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 3, pp. 275-309

We define and analyze a "strategic topology'' on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a fixed game and action define the distance between a pair of types as the difference...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599372

Coordination stratégique et connaissance commune dans les réseaux de communication

Hagenbach, Jeanne; Koessler, Frédéric - In: Revue d'économie industrielle n° 114-115 (2006) 2, pp. 10-10

Based on the work of Chwe (1999, 2000), we study how communication networks influence the diffusion of information and decision making in a class of coordination games under incomplete information. This framework can be used, for example, to analyze the diffusion of a new technology standard...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011020450

Connaissance commune et consensus

Ménager, Lucie - In: Revue d'économie industrielle n° 114-115 (2006) 2, pp. 4-4

In a seminal paper, Aumann [1976] showed that if agents have common knowledge of their posterior probabilities of some … rise to a vast literature about the implications of common knowledge for consensus. The aim of this paper is first to … present how knowledge and common knowledge are modelled in economic analysis. Then we review some extensions of Aumann …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011020498

Fondements épistémiques de concepts d'équilibre en théorie des jeux

Ménager, Lucie; Tercieux, Olivier - In: Revue d'économie industrielle n° 114-115 (2006) 2, pp. 3-3

equilibrium. In particular, we insist on the role played by the assumption of common knowledge of the players?rationality. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011020517

The pros and cons of higher transparency : the case of speculative attacks

ALLEGRET, Jean-Pierre; CORNAND, Camille - Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), … - 2006

The aim of this paper is to evaluate to what extent more transparency can reduce the occurrence of speculative attacks. It proposes a survey of the literature about the pros and cons of transparency on the exchange rate market, which is one of the main pillars of the new international financial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004985502

Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms"

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2006

A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages leads to outcomes that agree with the social choice at every type profile. In an interdependent value environment with single crossing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087399