Search Results - subject:"Common Knowledge"

Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2006

A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages leads to outcomes that agree with the social choice function for all beliefs at every type profile. In an interdependent value environment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593452

Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2006

A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages leads to outcomes that agree with the social choice at every type profile. In an interdependent value environment, we identify a strict...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593470

Topologies on Type

Dekel, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2006

�cation and keywords: C70, C72, rationalizability, incomplete informa- tion, common knowledge, universal type space, strategic … di�erence between common knowledge and mutual knowledge of order n that is emphasized by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis … implications of common knowledge of rationality without the common prior assumption. Dekel, Fudenberg, and Levine (2004) have …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766882

Topologies on types

Dekel, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 3, pp. 275-309

We define and analyze a "strategic topology'' on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a fixed game and action define the distance between a pair of types as the difference...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005812752

Robert Aumann's Game and Economic Theory

Hart, Sergiu - Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University … - 2006

n overview of the landmark contributions of Robert J. Aumann, winner of the 2005 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005752835

Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige

O'Neill, Barry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2006

Leaders and historians see prestige as important, but international relations theorists have neglected the concept, in part for lack of a clear definition. It is proposed that a party "holds prestige" when group members generally believe that the party has a certain desirable quality, and this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762500

Cason, Timothy N.; Sharma, Tridib - Krannert School of Management, Purdue University - 2006

This study reports a laboratory experiment wherein subjects play a hawk-dove game. We try to implement a correlated equilibrium with payoffs outside the convex hull of Nash equilibrium payoffs by privately recommending play. We find that subjects are reluctant to follow certain recommendations....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835337

The Pros and Cons of Higher Transparency: The Case of Speculative Attacks

Allegret, Jean-Pierre; Cornand, Camille - HAL - 2006

The aim of this paper is to evaluate to what extent more transparency can reduce the occurrence of speculative attacks. It proposes a survey of the literature about the pros and cons of transparency on the exchange rate market, which is one of the main pillars of the new international financial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008792045

Topologies on types

Dekel-Tabak, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 1 (2006) 3, pp. 275-309

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011703019

Agreement theorem for neo-additive beliefs

Lefort, Jean-Philippe; Dominiak, Adam - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2013

In this paper, we extend Aumann’s (Ann Stat 4:1236–1239, 1976) probabilistic agreement theorem to situations in which agents’ prior beliefs are represented by a common neo-additive capacity. In particular, we characterize the family of updating rules for neo-additive capacities, which are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011166521