Search Results - subject:"Common Knowledge"

An Axiomatic Model of Non-Bayesian Updating

Epstein, Larry - University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research … - 2002

This paper models an agent in a three-period setting who does not update according to Bayes'Rule, and who is self-aware and anticipates her updating behavior when formulating plans. The agent is rational in the sense that her dynamic behavior is derived from a single stable preference order on a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504009

Stock Market as a 'Beauty Contest': Investor Beliefs and Price Bubbles sans Dividend Anchors

Hirota, Shinichi; Sunder, Shyam - School of Management, Yale University - 2002

these three conditions are common knowledge among the investors. We argue that when the deviation of security markets from …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368985

Stock Market as a 'Beauty Contest': Investor Beliefs and Price Bubbles sans Dividend Anchors

Hirota, Shinichi; Sunder, Shyam NMI - School of Management, Yale University - 2002

these three conditions are common knowledge among the investors. We argue that when the deviation of security markets from …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005587090

Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study

Nagel, Rosemarie; Cabrales, Antonio; Armenter, Roc - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2002

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertainty about the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have been used in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problems of equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives a noisy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772141

Overt and Underlying Games: The Case of the Centipede

Beretta, Carlo - In: Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali 118 (2010) 1, pp. 27-45

Making use of and following substantive rationality is a costly and not always feasible option. In games, this option generates two levels of reasoning. The player has to decide how to play the overt game, but this requires him to decide how to play an underlying game in which the alternatives...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010786828

Overt and Underlying Games: The Case of the Centipede

Beretta, Carlo - In: Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali (2010) 1, pp. 27-45

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010571211

How design principles can govern the knowledge commons : Elinor Ostrom and the case of Wikipedia

Noack, Kathrin; Weinhardt, Christof; Dreier, Thomas - In: Information management and market engineering, (pp. 243-260). 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008856586

Information at equilibrium

Minelli, Enrico; Polemarchakis, H. - 2001

; and strategies are common knowledge. If each player has a veto act, which yields a minimum payoff that no other profile of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318881

Common knowledge with monotone statistics

Bergin, James - 2001

common knowledge of the value of the aggregator function implies (with probability one) that the individual statistics are … individual statistics are equal when the value of the aggregate statistic is common knowledge. …When individual statistics are aggregated through a strictly monotone function to anaggregate statistic, common …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009475658

Knowing What Others Know: Common Knowledge, Accounting, and Capital Markets

Sunder, Shyam - School of Management, Yale University - 2001

The concept of common knowledge concerning higher orders of knowledge has seen exciting new developments in the fields … these fields. Common knowledge thinking may significantly advance our understanding of financial reporting, analysis … idea of common knowledge originated. This paper is an overview of common knowledge and its actual and potential …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005586890