Search Results - subject:"Common Knowledge"

Counterfactual Reasoning and Common Knowledge of Rationality in Normal Form Games

Zambrano, Eduardo - In: Topics in Theoretical Economics 4 (2004) 1, pp. 1020-1020

to the actual world where the hypothetical deviation occurs. I show that in this model common knowledge of rationality … need not lead to rationalizability. I also present assumptions that allow rationalizability to follow from common knowledge …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005458937

Coexistence of Strategies and Culturally-Specific Common Knowledge: An Evolutionary Analysis

Antoci, Angelo; Sacco, Pier; Zarri, Luca - In: Journal of Bioeconomics 6 (2004) 2, pp. 165-194

assume that common knowledge about the payoffs of the game is 'culturally-specific'. In this context, we examine both the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005715782

The Blues Goes On But When Does It Stop? Public Goods Experiments with Non-Definite and Non-Commonly Known Time Horizons

Gonzalez, Luis G.; Gueth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2004

A robust finding of repeated public goods experiments is that high initial contribution rates sharply decline towards the end. This paper reports on an exploratory experiment designed to discover whether such a decline is simply triggered by the usual experimental practice of publicly informing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005252208

Information at equilibrium

Minelli, E.; Polemarchakis, H. - In: Economic Theory 21 (2003) 2, pp. 573-584

; and strategies are common knowledge. If each player has a veto act, which yields a minimum payoff that no other profile of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370843

Incentive compatible contractible information

Bond, Philip - In: Economic Theory 22 (2003) 2, pp. 375-394

The paper seeks to characterize what information is always available for contracting, independent of the form of the contract and the probabilities of different states of nature. The paper denotes such information as contractible. It is established that it is possible to speak uniquely of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371008

Rationality, preferences and irregular war

Salazar, Boris; Castillo, Maria del Pilar - In: Colombian Economic Journal 1 (2003) 1, pp. 15-33

We suppose that civilians under threat prefer certain situations within a context of irregular war and endangered survival; they will prefer those situations associated with greater probabilities of survival. Using lexicographical preferences and belief systems, we have shown that civilians will...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593720

Agreeing to agree

Lehrer, Ehud; Samet, Dov - EconWPA - 2003

Aumann(1976) has shown that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event E … it is common knowledge that the posteriors for E *do* coincide? A necessary and sufficient condition for this is the … existence of a nonempty *finite* event F with the following two properties. First, it is common knowledge at $F$ that the agents …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550922

Speculative Behaviour, Debt Default and Contagion: An Explanation of the Latin American Crisis 2001-2002

Allsopp, Louise - Centre for International Economic Studies, School of … - 2003

This paper provides a model incorporating strategic speculative behaviour into a framework of debt default and contagion. A basic model of contagion shows how economies which appear fundamentally sound, can fail to meet foreign obligations when there are inter-linkages with a defaulting country....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008740156

Faulty Communication: Some Variations on the Electronic Mail Game

Morris, Stephen E - In: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 1 (2002) 1

Abstract The electronic mail game of Rubinstein (1989) showed that a lack of common knowledge generated by faulty …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014588983

Faulty Communication: Some Variations on the Electronic Mail Game

Morris, Stephen - In: Advances in Theoretical Economics 1 (2002) 1, pp. 1027-1027

The electronic mail game of Rubinstein (1989) showed that a lack of common knowledge generated by faulty communication …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005751126