Search Results - subject:"Common Knowledge"

Epistemic Conditions for Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, and Common Knowledge of Rationality

Polak, Ben - Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics … - 1997

equilibrium in beliefs also imply common knowledge of rationality. We then consider beliefs held in games of incomplete …. Whether or not these new conditions imply common knowledge of rationality depends on which formal definition of a Bayesian …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005797435

Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information

Volij, Oscar - EconWPA - 1997

We analyze an economy with asymmetric information and endogenize the possibilities for information transmission between members of a coalition. We then define a concept of the Core that takes into account these communication possibilities. The internal consistency of the improvements is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118634

Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-fulfilling Currency Attacks

Morris, Stephen; Shin, Hyun Song - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

Even though self-fulfilling currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria when fundamentals are common knowledge, we …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123609

Epistemic Conditions for Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, and Common Knowledge of Rationality

Polak, Ben - Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics … - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010720228

A Necessary and Sufficient Epistemic Condition for Playing Backward Induction

Balkenborg, Dieter; Winter, Eyal - University of Bonn, Germany - 1995

In an epistemic framework due to Aumann we characterize the condition on the rationality of the players that is both necessary and sufficient to imply backward induction in perfect information games in agent form. This condition requires each player to know that the players are rational at...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968249

The Logic of Shared Belief, Public Rumor, Public Shared Belief and Common Belief.

Bonanno, G. - California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs - 1994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005474474

Negotiation Analysis: A Characterization and Review

Sebenius, James K. - In: Management Science 38 (1992) 1, pp. 18-38

generally assume that all the elements of the "game" are common knowledge. Thus, the negotiation analytic approach tends to de …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009209397

Common Knowledge of a Multivariate Aggregate Statistic

Nielsen, Lars Tyge - European Science Foundation Network in Financial … - 1990

market model with asymmetric information, the result implies that the equilibrium price is common knowledge only if all …If a stochastically monotone function of asymmetrically informed individuals' expectations of a random vector is common … knowledge, than all the individuals must agree on their expectations. This result generalizes the theorem of Nielsen …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656108

Common Knowledge of Price and Expected Cost in an Oligopolistic Market

Nielsen, Lars Tyge - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 1990

-Cournot equilibria where the price is common knowledge. On this basis the existence of rational expectations equilibria is shown, the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005225450

A simple characterization of stochastically monotone functions

Bergin, James - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 58 (1990) 5, pp. 1241-1243

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001094782