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  • Search: subject:"Common prior assumption"
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Year of publication
Subject
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common prior assumption 5 higher order belief 3 incomplete information 2 robustness 2 Common Prior Assumption 1 Epistemology 1 Erkenntnistheorie 1 Game theory 1 Incomplete Information 1 Incomplete information 1 Intersubjective Rationality 1 Like-Mindedness 1 Pluralism 1 Rationality 1 Rationalität 1 Relativism 1 Spieltheorie 1 Unvollkommene Information 1 belief hierarchies 1 belief potential 1 common knowledge 1 contagion 1 epistemic game theory 1 epistemic models 1 games 1 heterogeneous prior beliefs 1 interactive epistemology 1 isomorphism 1 maximal reduction 1 possible worlds 1 rationalizability 1 states 1 transformation procedures 1 types 1
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Online availability
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Free 6
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 5 Article 1
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Article in journal 1 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 1
Language
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Undetermined 4 English 2
Author
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Oyama, Daisuke 3 Tercieux, Olivier 3 Bach, Christian W. 1 Hellman, Ziv 1 Nehring, Klaus 1 Perea, Andrés 1
Institution
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Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 4 School of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study 1
Published in...
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MPRA Paper 4 Economic inquiry 1 Economics Working Papers / School of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study 1
Source
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RePEc 5 ECONIS (ZBW) 1
Showing 1 - 6 of 6
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Structure-preserving transformations of epistemic models
Bach, Christian W.; Perea, Andrés - In: Economic inquiry 61 (2023) 3, pp. 693-719
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014308622
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Common Knowledge and Disparate Priors: When it is O.K. to Agree to Disagree
Hellman, Ziv - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
Abandoning the oft-presumed common prior assumption, partitioned type spaces with disparate priors are studied. It is … elements of this pair approach each other,a common prior is identified, and standard results stemming from the common prior … assumption are recapitulated. It is further shown that this two-player fundamental pair of priors is a special case of the n …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005790070
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Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors
Oyama, Daisuke; Tercieux, Olivier - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005
This paper considers the robustness of equilibria to a small amount of incomplete information, where players are allowed to have heterogenous priors. An equilibrium of a complete information game is robust to incomplete information under non-common priors if for every incomplete information game...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107849
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Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors
Oyama, Daisuke; Tercieux, Olivier - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005
This paper considers the robustness of equilibria to a small amount of incomplete information, where players are allowed to have heterogenous priors. An equilibrium of a complete information game is robust to incomplete information under non-common priors if for every incomplete information game...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789875
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On the Strategic Impact of an Event under Non-Common Priors
Oyama, Daisuke; Tercieux, Olivier - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005
discrepancy from the common prior assumption. In particular, its global impact can be arbitrarily large under non-common priors …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005837461
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Common Priors For Like-Minded Agents
Nehring, Klaus - School of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study - 2003
Two agents are like-minded when their beliefs are equal once conditioned on knowledge of both of their types. Assuming the existence of an outside observer that is commonly known to be likeminded and uninformative about the insiders, we derive the existence of a common prior among the insiders,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005163085
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