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  • Search: subject:"Communication equilibrium"
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Year of publication
Subject
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communication equilibrium 17 Nash equilibrium 7 correlated equilibrium 7 Bayesian game 6 Communication 6 Communication equilibrium 6 Game theory 6 Spieltheorie 6 cheap talk 6 pre-play communication 6 Correlated equilibrium 5 Equilibrium model 5 Equilibrium theory 5 Gleichgewichtsmodell 5 Gleichgewichtstheorie 5 Incomplete information 5 Kommunikation 5 Nash-Gleichgewicht 5 information design 4 information structures 4 revelation principle 4 sequential communication equilibrium 4 Asymmetric information 3 Asymmetrische Information 3 Bayesian games 3 Economics of information 3 Informationsökonomik 3 Unvollkommene Information 3 Bayes correlated equilibrium 2 Bayes' correlated equilibrium 2 Correlation device 2 Implementation 2 Mechanism 2 Mechanism design 2 Multistage games 2 Nichtkooperatives Spiel 2 Revelation principle 2 multi-stage games 2 Agency theory 1 Bayes-Nash equilibrium 1
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Online availability
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Free 23 CC license 1
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 16 Article 7
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Working Paper 5 Article in journal 4 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 4 Arbeitspapier 2 Article 2 Graue Literatur 2 Non-commercial literature 2
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Language
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English 18 Undetermined 5
Author
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Forges, Françoise 6 Vida, Péter 6 Renou, Ludovic 4 FORGES, Françoise 2 Forges, Francoise 2 Gerardi, Dino 2 MINELLI, Enrico 2 Makris, Miltiadis 2 Makrēs, Miltiadēs 2 Milchtaich, Igal 2 Alonso, Ricardo 1 Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol 1 GIRAUD, Gaël 1 Gonçalves, Ricardo 1 Koessler, Frédéric 1 Mitusch, Kay 1 Myerson, Roger B. 1 ROCHON, Céline 1 Rantakari, Heikki 1 Ray, Indrajit 1 Salamanca, Andrés 1 Strausz, Roland 1
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Institution
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Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain 3 Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 2 CESifo 1 Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University 1 Faculdade de Economia e Gestão, Universidade Católica Portuguesa 1 London School of Economics (LSE) 1 Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) 1
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Published in...
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CORE Discussion Papers 3 Theoretical Economics 3 Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2 Journal of mathematical economics 2 Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory 2 Working Paper 2 CESifo Working Paper 1 CESifo Working Paper Series 1 Departmental Working Papers 1 Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 1 LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 1 Working Papers / Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University 1 Working Papers de Economia (Economics Working Papers) 1 Working paper 1 Working papers / Rutgers University, Department of Economics 1
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Source
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RePEc 12 ECONIS (ZBW) 6 EconStor 5
Showing 1 - 10 of 23
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Information design in multi-stage games
Makris, Miltiadis; Renou, Ludovic - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 4, pp. 1475-1509
This paper generalizes the concept of Bayes correlated equilibrium (Bergemann and Morris, 2016) to multi-stage games. We apply our characterization results to a number of illustrative examples and applications.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537039
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Information design in multistage games
Makrēs, Miltiadēs; Renou, Ludovic - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 18 (2023) 4, pp. 1475-1509
This paper generalizes the concept of Bayes' correlated equilibrium Bergemann and Morris (2016) to multistage games. We apply our characterization results to a number of illustrative examples and applications.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014440070
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Interacting mechanisms : a perspective on generalized principal-agent problems
Forges, Françoise; Koessler, Frédéric; Salamanca, Andrés - In: Journal of mathematical economics 114 (2024), pp. 1-13
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015072119
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"Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies" : back to the roots
Forges, Françoise; Ray, Indrajit - In: Journal of mathematical economics 114 (2024), pp. 1-9
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015072121
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Information design in multi-stage games
Makris, Miltiadis; Renou, Ludovic - 2018
obtain in any (sequential) communication equilibrium of any expansion of multi-stage games, i.e., when players can receive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012144205
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Information design in multi-stage games
Makrēs, Miltiadēs; Renou, Ludovic - 2018
obtain in any (sequential) communication equilibrium of any expansion of multi-stage games, i.e., when players can receive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011872424
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Equilibria in infinite games of incomplete information
Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol - 2017
The notion of communication equilibrium extends Aumann's [3] correlated equilibrium concept for complete information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011614260
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The art of brevity
Alonso, Ricardo; Rantakari, Heikki - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2014
talk. This result is based on the existence for these games of a communication equilibrium with an infinite number of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126096
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Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case
Forges, Françoise; Vida, Péter - In: Theoretical Economics 8 (2013) 1, pp. 95-123
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599477
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Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case
Forges, Françoise; Vida, Péter - In: Theoretical Economics 8 (2013) 1
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009416868
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