EconBiz - Find Economic Literature
    • Logout
    • Change account settings
  • A-Z
  • Beta
  • About EconBiz
  • News
  • Thesaurus (STW)
  • Academic Skills
  • Help
  •  My account 
    • Logout
    • Change account settings
  • Login
EconBiz - Find Economic Literature
Publications Events
Search options
Advanced Search history
My EconBiz
Favorites Loans Reservations Fines
    You are here:
  • Home
  • Search: subject:"Compromise stability"
Narrow search

Narrow search

Year of publication
Subject
All
Cooperative game 4 Core 4 Kooperatives Spiel 4 NTU-bankruptcy game 4 NTU-bankruptcy problem 4 compromise stability 4 Adjusted proportional rule 3 Coalitional merge convexity 3 Compromise stability 3 Core cover 3 Game theory 3 Ordinal convexity 3 Spieltheorie 3 assignment games 3 core cover 3 k-compromise admissibility 3 k-compromise stability 3 k-core cover 3 Insolvency 2 Insolvenz 2 nucleolus 2 Alexia value 1 Coalition 1 Communication 1 Koalition 1 Kommunikation 1 Shapley value 1 Shapley-Wert 1 Theorie 1 Theory 1 Transferable utility 1 Transferierbarer Nutzen 1 bankruptcy 1 bankruptcy games 1 communication situations 1 core 1 dual Alexia value 1 game theoretic bankruptcy rule 1 graph-restricted game 1 inheritance of properties 1
more ... less ...
Online availability
All
Free 10
Type of publication
All
Book / Working Paper 10
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Working Paper 6 Arbeitspapier 4 Graue Literatur 4 Non-commercial literature 4
Language
All
English 6 Undetermined 4
Author
All
Borm, Peter 9 Estévez-Fernández, Arantza 6 Fiestras-Janeiro, M. Gloria 6 Mosquera, Manuel A. 3 Sánchez-Rodríguez, Estela 3 Dietzenbacher, Bas 2 Grundel, S. 1 Hamers, H.J.M. 1 Lohmann, E.R.M.A. 1 Quant, Marieke 1 Schouten, Jop 1
more ... less ...
Institution
All
Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2 Tinbergen Instituut 2
Published in...
All
Discussion Paper / Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2 Discussion paper / Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University 2 Discussion paper / Tinbergen Institute 2 Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2 Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 2
Source
All
ECONIS (ZBW) 4 RePEc 4 EconStor 2
Showing 1 - 10 of 10
Cover Image
The nucleolus and inheritance of properties in communication situations
Schouten, Jop; Dietzenbacher, Bas; Borm, Peter - 2019
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011985953
Saved in:
Cover Image
Bankruptcy games with nontransferable utility
Dietzenbacher, Bas - 2017
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011748714
Saved in:
Cover Image
Nontransferable Utility Bankruptcy Games
Estévez-Fernández, Arantza; Borm, Peter; … - 2014
merge convex and ordinal convex. Generalizing the notions of core cover and compromise stability for transferable utility … shown to retain the two characterizing properties of TU-bankruptcy games: convexity and compromise stability. As a first …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010377244
Saved in:
Cover Image
Nontransferable Utility Bankruptcy Games
Estévez-Fernández, Arantza; Borm, Peter; … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014
merge convex and ordinal convex. Generalizing the notions of core cover and compromise stability for transferable utility … shown to retain the two characterizing properties of TU-bankruptcy games: convexity and compromise stability. As a first …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256320
Saved in:
Cover Image
Nontransferable utility bankruptcy games
Estévez-Fernández, Arantza; Borm, Peter; … - 2014
merge convex and ordinal convex. Generalizing the notions of core cover and compromise stability for transferable utility … shown to retain the two characterizing properties of TU-bankruptcy games: convexity and compromise stability. As a first …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010250500
Saved in:
Cover Image
Characterizing the Core via k-Core Covers
Sánchez-Rodríguez, Estela; Borm, Peter; … - 2013
This paper extends the notion of individual minimal rights for a transferable utility game (TU-game) to coalitional minimal rights using minimal balanced families of a specific type, thus defining a corresponding minimal rights game. It is shown that the core of a TU-game coincides with the core...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326133
Saved in:
Cover Image
Characterizing the Core via k-Core Covers
Sánchez-Rodríguez, Estela; Borm, Peter; … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013
This paper extends the notion of individual minimal rights for a transferable utility game (TU-game) to coalitional minimal rights using minimal balanced families of a specific type, thus defining a corresponding minimal rights game. It is shown that the core of a TU-game coincides with the core...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257257
Saved in:
Cover Image
Characterizing the core via k-core covers
Sánchez-Rodríguez, Estela; Borm, Peter; … - 2013
This paper extends the notion of individual minimal rights for a transferable utility game (TU-game) to coalitional minimal rights using minimal balanced families of a specific type, thus defining a corresponding minimal rights game. It is shown that the core of a TU-game coincides with the core...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010224779
Saved in:
Cover Image
A Compromise Stable Extension of Bankruptcy Games : Multipurpose Resource Allocation
Borm, Peter; Grundel, S.; Hamers, H.J.M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2011
This paper considers situations characterized by a common-pool resource, which needs to be divided among agents. Each of the agents has some claim on this pool and an individual reward function for assigned resources. This paper analyzes not only the problem of max- imizing the total joint...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090832
Saved in:
Cover Image
A Stroll with Alexia
Borm, Peter; Quant, Marieke; Lohmann, E.R.M.A. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2007
the importance of the notion of compromise stability for characterizing the Alexia value. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092221
Saved in:
A service of the
zbw
  • Sitemap
  • Plain language
  • Accessibility
  • Contact us
  • Imprint
  • Privacy

Loading...