Search Results - subject:"Conditional Cooperation"

Social Norms and Conditional Cooperative Taxpayers

Traxler, Christian - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006

This paper incorporates tax morale into the Allingham Sandmo (1972) model of income tax evasion. Tax morale is interpreted as a social norm for tax compliance. The norm strength, depending on the share of evaders in the society, is endogenously derived. Taxpayers act conditionally cooperative,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005121202

Heterogeneous social preferences and the dynamics of free riding in public goods

Fischbacher, Urs; Gaechter, Simon - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2006

We provide a direct test of the role of social preferences in voluntary cooperation. We elicit individuals’ cooperation preference in one experiment and make a point prediction about the contribution to a repeated public good. This allows for a novel test as to whether there are "types" of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150917

Heterogeneous social preferences and the dynamics of free riding in public goods

Fischbacher, Urs; Gaechter, Simon - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552253

Conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to a public good

Chaudhuri, Ananish; Paichayontvijit, Tirnud - In: Economics Bulletin 3 (2006) 8, pp. 1-14

We explore facets of conditional cooperation in a public goods game. First, we replicate the Fischbacher, Gächter and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010629591

Social norms and coditional cooperative taxpayers

Traxler, Christian - 2006

conditional cooperation works not only within but also between groups. If, for example, looser tax enforcement among one speciflc … alternative policy tools. JEL classiflcation: H26; Z13; K42. Keywords: Tax Evasion; Tax Morale; Social Norms; Conditional … Cooperation. ⁄E-mail: christian.traxler@lrz.uni-muenchen.de; Phone/Fax: +49 89 2180 -3303/-6296 1 Introduction In the past two …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003412385

Weak moral motivation leads to the decline of voluntary contributions

Figuieres, Charles; Masclet, David; Willinger, Marc - Département Sciences Sociales, Agriculture et … - 2013

prediction and the so-called restart effect, and it is compatible with the conditional cooperation hypothesis. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011204306

Leadership and conditional cooperation in public good games: What difference does the game make?

Cartwright, Edward J; Lovett, Denise - School of Economics, University of Kent - 2013

We investigate experimentally whether the extent of conditional cooperation in public good games depends on the … conditional cooperation. We also find no evidence that the type of game makes a difference to unconditional contributions. The …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010859420

On the independence of history: experience spill-overs between experiments

Matthey, Astrid; Regner, Tobias - In: Theory and Decision 75 (2013) 3, pp. 403-419

A central understanding in experimental economics is that subjects’ decisions in the lab are independent of history. We test whether this assumption of between-experiment independence is indeed justified. We analyze experiments with an allocation decision (like a dictator or ultimatum game)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010865839

Estimating the causal effect of beliefs on contributions in repeated public good games

Smith, Alexander - In: Experimental Economics 16 (2013) 3, pp. 414-425

We use instrumental variables for estimating the causal effect of beliefs on contributions in repeated public good games. The effect is about half as large as suggested by ordinary least squares. Thus, we present evidence that beliefs have a causal effect on contributions, but also that beliefs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010866250

Confusion and learning in the voluntary contributions game

Bayer, Ralph-C.; Renner, Elke; Sausgruber, Rupert - In: Experimental Economics 16 (2013) 4, pp. 478-496

We use a limited information environment to assess the role of confusion in the repeated voluntary contributions game. A comparison with play in a standard version of the game suggests, that the common claim that decision errors due to confused subjects biases estimates of cooperation upwards,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010866253