explores an unstudied question: whether trust is a substitute for, or a complement to, the availability of contract enforcement … opportunities. One intuition suggests that trust becomes more important when contract enforcement is weak, implying that they are … substitutes. We show, however, that trust can be a complement, mattering more when contract enforcement is stronger. Our evidence …

increases contract enforcement costs by inhibiting the coordination and monitoring of performance. Immigrant employees may … contract enforcement costs. Hiring one additional immigrant employee is linked to a relatively larger increase in offshoring at …

contract enforcement. An efficient legal framework and judicial process are conducive to creating an environment in which an …

explores an unstudied question: whether trust is a substitute for, or a complement to, the availability of contract enforcement … opportunities. One intuition suggests that trust becomes more important when contract enforcement is weak, implying that they are … substitutes. We show, however, that trust can be a complement, mattering more when contract enforcement is stronger. Our evidence …