Environmental governance increasingly focuses on public-private partnerships. We focus on contracting as a subset of the role of private actors governing landscape-level resources — such as wildlife habitats, scenic vistas, and firescapes — that exceed individual parcel sizes and are thus...

This article surveys the literature on principal-agent problems with moral hazard that gained popularity following the seminal works of Mirrlees (1976), Holmström (1979), and others. This literature is concerned with designing incentives to motivate one or more workers—typically by paying for...

Contractors have become a ubiquitous presence in the administrative state. How these private sector entities intersect with the rulemaking process, however, is not well understood. Unpacking contractors’ role in rulemaking is important, not least because rulemaking is the executive branch’s...

Problem Definition: Smart contract improves the supply chain efficiency by enabling the supplier’s commitment to post-shipment financing decisions, which mitigates the bank’s lending risk exposure and thereby reduces the financing cost. This paper investigates how smart contract adoption...

This article examines the collusive potential of first refusal contracts, which are contracts that grant one party, the buyer, a right of first refusal on the output of another party, the seller. When two parties enter into this type of contract, the seller is obligated to offer any output she...

We study an incentive problem of sequential tasks in a finite horizon dynamic setting. The principal can choose compensation incentive or termination threat. We characterize the optimal contracts and the principal’s strategy

This Paper makes three main contributions. First, this Paper surveys Algorand Smart Contracts and the Algorand Network, including software systems and algorithmic architectures. Second, this Paper discusses various software mechanisms enabling developers to execute transfers on the Algorand...