In this paper, a vertical mixed oligopoly framework is used to select the endogenous competition modes with a two-part tariff input price bargaining. We get the following result: First, the public firm does not have the dominant strategy and the private firm’s strictly dominant strategy is...

Contracts involving promises to commit criminal acts are ordinarily unenforceable. Yet nonenforcement does not fully deter incentives to form criminal agreements. This Article demonstrates that partial enforcement can generate greater deterrence incentives by disrupting the trust relationship...

This paper proposes a prior-free model of moral hazard wherein the principal's beliefs about the agent's production technology are characterized by revealed preference data. The principal and the agent are each financially risk neutral and the agent's preferences are understood to be quasilinear...

Abstract We develop a tractable model of competitive insurance markets with a continuum of types and exogenous restrictions on the set of allowed contracts. Our model nests, as special cases, the market for lemons of Akerlof (1970) and the unrestricted contracts setting of Rothschild and...