Search Results - subject:"Contractual incompleteness"

Integration versus outsourcing with vertical linkages

Minerva, Gaetano Alfredo - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011644439

Relational contracts as a foundation for contractual incompleteness

Desrieux, Claudine; Beuve, Jean - In: Economics Bulletin 31 (2011) 3, pp. 2030-2040

Contractual incompleteness is generally defined by a trade-off between costs and benefits. We examine this trade-off in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009150707

Control Rights in Complex Partnerships

Francesconi, Marco; Muthoo, Abhinay - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2010

This paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two players who are in a “complex” partnership, that is, a partnership which produces impure public goods. We show that the optimal allocation depends on technological factors, the parties’ valuations of the goods...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008515188

Control rights in public-private partnerships

Francesconi, Marco; Muthoo, Abhinay - 2006

This paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two parties that produce impure public goods. We show that the optimal allocation depends on technological factors, the parties' valuations of the goods produced, and the degree of impurity of these goods. When the degree of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268030

Subjective ambiguity and moral hazard in a principal-agent model

Basili, Marcello; Franzini, Maurizio - Dipartimento di Economia e Diritto, Facoltà di Economia - 2002

explanation for contractual incompleteness with respect to the traditional approach in terms of transactions costs. This paper … possible to generalize the Mukerji (1998) approach to contractual incompleteness. In fact, it shows that incomplete contracts … are costly and that, before reaching the conclusion that ambiguity leads to contractual incompleteness, their costs should …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009649880

Contract Mix and Ownership

Bai, Chong-en; Tao, Zhigang - Department of Economics, Boston College - 1997

This paper analyzes a model with many homogeneous agents, whose effort can be allocated to two tasks. One task produces a public good that is an important input for the production of the final output. The other task only affects the agent's own output. We show that, when the public input and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005102696