//--> //--> //-->
Toggle navigation
Logout
Change account settings
EN
DE
ES
FR
A-Z
Beta
About EconBiz
News
Thesaurus (STW)
Academic Skills
Help
EN
DE
ES
FR
My account
Logout
Change account settings
Login
Publications
Events
Your search terms
Search
Search options
All Fields
Title
Exact title
Subject
Author
Institution
ISBN/ISSN
Published in...
Publisher
Open Access only
Advanced
Search history
My EconBiz
Favorites
Loans
Reservations
Fines
You are here:
Home
Search: subject:"Credible deviation"
Narrow search
Narrow search
Year of publication
From:
To:
Subject
All
ACDC
7
cheap talk
5
credible deviation
5
experiment
5
neologism proofness
5
announcement proofness
4
Asymmetrische Information
3
Experiment
3
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
3
Asymmetric information
2
Cheap talk
2
Credible deviation
2
Dynamisches Spiel
2
Game theory
2
Neologism proofness
2
Noncooperative game
2
Refinement
2
Spieltheorie
2
Communication
1
Dynamic game
1
Kommunikation
1
Theorie
1
refinement
1
more ...
less ...
Online availability
All
Free
7
Type of publication
All
Book / Working Paper
7
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Working Paper
4
Arbeitspapier
2
Graue Literatur
2
Non-commercial literature
2
Language
All
English
4
Undetermined
3
Author
All
Offerman, Theo
7
Onderstal, Sander
7
Ruiz, Adrian de Groot
3
Groot Ruiz, Adrian de
2
de Groot Ruiz, Adrian
2
Institution
All
Tinbergen Instituut
2
Tinbergen Institute
1
Published in...
All
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
3
Discussion paper / Tinbergen Institute
2
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper
2
Source
All
RePEc
3
ECONIS (ZBW)
2
EconStor
2
Showing
1
-
7
of
7
Sort
relevance
articles prioritized
date (newest first)
date (oldest first)
1
Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Cheap Talk Games
de Groot Ruiz, Adrian
;
Offerman, Theo
;
Onderstal, Sander
-
2015
. According to our Average
Credible
Deviation
Criterion (ACDC), the stability of an equilibrium is determined by the frequency and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491401
Saved in:
2
Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Cheap Talk Games
Ruiz, Adrian de Groot
;
Offerman, Theo
;
Onderstal, Sander
-
Tinbergen Instituut
-
2015
. According to our Average
Credible
Deviation
Criterion (ACDC), the stability of an equilibrium is determined by the frequency and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257267
Saved in:
3
Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games
Groot Ruiz, Adrian de
;
Offerman, Theo
;
Onderstal, Sander
-
2015
. According to our Average
Credible
Deviation
Criterion (ACDC), the stability of an equilibrium is determined by the frequency and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010477113
Saved in:
4
Equilibrium selection in cheap talk games : ACDC rocks when other criteria remain silent
Groot Ruiz, Adrian de
;
Offerman, Theo
;
Onderstal, Sander
-
2012
. According to our Average
Credible
Deviation
Criterion (ACDC), the stability of an equilibrium is determined by the frequency and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383193
Saved in:
5
Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent
de Groot Ruiz, Adrian
;
Offerman, Theo
;
Onderstal, Sander
-
2011
. According to our Average
Credible
Deviation
Criterion (ACDC), the stability of an equilibrium is determined by the frequency and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325937
Saved in:
6
Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent
Ruiz, Adrian de Groot
;
Offerman, Theo
;
Onderstal, Sander
-
Tinbergen Instituut
-
2011
. According to our Average
Credible
Deviation
Criterion (ACDC), the stability of an equilibrium is determined by the frequency and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256700
Saved in:
7
Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent
Ruiz, Adrian de Groot
;
Offerman, Theo
;
Onderstal, Sander
-
Tinbergen Institute
-
2011
. According to our Average
Credible
Deviation
Criterion (ACDC), the stability of an equilibrium is determined by the frequency and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838631
Saved in:
Results per page
10
25
50
100
250
A service of the
zbw
×
Loading...
//-->