We consider a class of symmetric two-person quadratic games where coarse correlated equilibria - CCE - (Moulin and Vial 1978) can strictly improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoffs, while correlated equilibrium - CE - (Aumann 1974, 1987) cannot, because these games are potential games. We...

Рассматривается применение модели Бертрана с логарифмической функцией полезности для выбора ценовой стратегии организации в условиях дифференцированной...

Проведен анализ классических моделей количественной дуополии при неравных предельных и постоянных издержках участников с целью выбора стратегии организации...

We consider a class of symmetric two-person quadratic games where coarse correlated equilibria – CCE – (Moulin and Vial [16]) can strictly improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoffs, while correlated equilibrium – CE – (Aumann [3,4]) cannot, because these games are potential games with...

In this paper, we consider a two-dimensional map (a duopoly game) in which the fixed point is destabilized via a subcritical Neimark–Hopf (N–H) bifurcation. Our aim is to investigate, via numerical examples, some global bifurcations associated with the appearance of repelling closed...