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  • Search: subject:"Deferred acceptance rules"
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Year of publication
Subject
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deferred acceptance rules 3 second-best incentive compatibility 3 top trading cycles rules 3 Indivisible goods 2 Strategy-proofness 2 Unteilbare Güter 2 strategy-proofness 2 Allocation 1 Allokation 1 Core 1 Deferred acceptance rules 1 Market design 1 Market mechanism 1 Marktmechanismus 1 Matching 1 Mechanism design 1 Mechanismus-Design-Theorie 1 Neue politische Ökonomie 1 Public choice 1 Second Best 1 Second best 1 Second-best incentive compatibility 1 Theorie 1 Theory 1 Top trading cycles rules 1
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Online availability
All
Free 3 Undetermined 1
Type of publication
All
Book / Working Paper 3 Article 1
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Working Paper 2 Arbeitspapier 1 Article in journal 1 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 1 Graue Literatur 1 Non-commercial literature 1
Language
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English 3 Undetermined 1
Author
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Anno, Hidekazu 4 Kurino, Morimitsu 4
Institution
All
Abteilung "Verhalten auf Märkten", Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) 1
Published in...
All
Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior 1 Discussion paper / Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), Research Area Markets and Choice, Research Unit Market Behavior 1 Games and economic behavior 1 WZB Discussion Paper 1
Source
All
ECONIS (ZBW) 2 EconStor 1 RePEc 1
Showing 1 - 4 of 4
Cover Image
Second-best incentive compatible allocation rules for multiple-type indivisible objects
Anno, Hidekazu; Kurino, Morimitsu - 2014
We consider the problem of allocating several types of indivisible goods when preferences are separable and monetary transfers are not allowed. Our finding is that the coordinatewise application of strategy-proof and non-wasteful rules yields a strategy-proof rule with the following efficiency...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333361
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Cover Image
Second-best incentive compatible allocation rules for multiple-type indivisible objects
Anno, Hidekazu; Kurino, Morimitsu - Abteilung "Verhalten auf Märkten", … - 2014
We consider the problem of allocating several types of indivisible goods when preferences are separable and monetary transfers are not allowed. Our finding is that the coordinatewise application of strategy-proof and non-wasteful rules yields a strategy-proof rule with the following efficiency...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010955341
Saved in:
Cover Image
Second-best incentive compatible allocation rules for multiple-type indivisible objects
Anno, Hidekazu; Kurino, Morimitsu - 2014
We consider the problem of allocating several types of indivisible goods when preferences are separable and monetary transfers are not allowed. Our finding is that the coordinatewise application of strategy-proof and non-wasteful rules yields a strategy-proof rule with the following efficiency...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010250132
Saved in:
Cover Image
On the operation of multiple matching markets
Anno, Hidekazu; Kurino, Morimitsu - In: Games and economic behavior 100 (2016), pp. 166-185
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771566
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