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  • Search: subject:"Delegation of Competence"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Credibility 6 Delegation of Competence 6 Dilemma of the Strong State 5 International Organizations 5 Glaubwürdigkeit 3 Internationale Organisation 3 Länderrisiko 3 Mitgliedschaft 3 Welt 3 Nationalstaat 2 Regierung 2 credibility 2 delegation of competence 2 dilemma of the strong state 2 international organizations 2 Commonwealth 1 Economic History 1 England 1 Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 1 Judicial Independence 1 Justiz 1 Schätzung 1 Wirtschaftsgeschichte 1 Wirtschaftspolitik 1 Wirtschaftswachstum 1 international 1
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Online availability
All
Free 8
Type of publication
All
Book / Working Paper 8
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Working Paper 5
Language
All
English 7 Undetermined 1
Author
All
Voigt, Stefan 8 Dreher, Axel 6 Blume, Lorenz 1 Ebeling, Michael 1
Institution
All
CESifo 1 KOF Swiss Economic Institute, Department of Management, Technology and Economics (D-MTEC) 1 Volkswirtschaft Abteilung, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften 1
Published in...
All
Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 2 CESifo Working Paper 1 CESifo Working Paper Series 1 KOF Working Papers 1 KOF Working papers 1 MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics 1 MAGKS Papers on Economics 1
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Source
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EconStor 5 RePEc 3
Showing 1 - 8 of 8
Cover Image
Does membership in international organizations increase governments' credibility?: testing the effects of delegating powers
Dreher, Axel; Voigt, Stefan - 2008
This paper analyzes whether nation-state governments can increase their credibility by becoming members of international organizations. Credibility is an important asset because it determines the real interest rate and is expected to have an important impact on investment and growth. It is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264350
Saved in:
Cover Image
Does membership in international organizations increase governments' credibility? Testing the effects of delegating powers
Dreher, Axel; Voigt, Stefan - 2008
This paper analyzes whether nation-state governments can increase their credibility by becoming members of international organizations. Credibility is an important asset because it determines the real interest rate and is expected to have an important impact on investment and growth. It is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265872
Saved in:
Cover Image
Does membership in international organizations increase governments' credibility? Testing the effects of delegating powers
Dreher, Axel; Voigt, Stefan - 2008
This paper analyzes whether nation-state governments can increase their credibility by becoming members of international organizations. Credibility is an important asset because it determines the real interest rate and is expected to have an important impact on investment and growth. It is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277771
Saved in:
Cover Image
Does Membership in International Organizations Increase Governments’ Credibility? Testing the Effects of Delegating Powers
Dreher, Axel; Voigt, Stefan - Volkswirtschaft Abteilung, Fachbereich … - 2008
This paper analyzes whether nation-state governments can increase their credibility by becoming members of international organizations. Credibility is an important asset because it determines the real interest rate and is expected to have an important impact on investment and growth. It is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005652895
Saved in:
Cover Image
Does Membership in International Organizations Increase Governments’ Credibility? Testing the Effects of Delegating Powers
Dreher, Axel; Voigt, Stefan - KOF Swiss Economic Institute, Department of Management, … - 2008
This paper analyzes whether nation-state governments can increase their credibility by becoming members of international organizations. Credibility is an important asset because it determines the real interest rate and is expected to have an important impact on investment and growth. It is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731503
Saved in:
Cover Image
Does Membership in International Organizations Increase Governments’ Credibility? Testing the Effects of Delegating Powers
Dreher, Axel; Voigt, Stefan - CESifo - 2008
This paper analyzes whether nation-state governments can increase their credibility by becoming members of international organizations. Credibility is an important asset because it determines the real interest rate and is expected to have an important impact on investment and growth. It is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181427
Saved in:
Cover Image
Membership has its Privileges: On the Effects of Delegating Powers Internationally
Voigt, Stefan - 2005
This paper analyzes whether nation-state governments can increase their credibility by becoming members of international organizations. Credibility is an important asset because it determines the real interest rate and is expected to have an important impact on investment and growth. It is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263282
Saved in:
Cover Image
Improving Credibility by Delegating Judicial Competence: The Case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
Voigt, Stefan; Ebeling, Michael; Blume, Lorenz - 2004
It is argued that government credibility is an important resource and that it can be improved by delegating decision-making competence beyond the nation-state. It is hypothesized that such delegation should result in higher income and growth. Some former British colonies retained the Judicial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263276
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