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  • Search: subject:"Design optimal"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Agency Theory 1 Asymmetrische Information 1 Cumulative Prospect Theory 1 Design optimal 1 Extensives Spiel 1 Lottery-Linked-Deposit Account 1 Mechanism design Optimal auctions Bunching 1 Probability Weighting 1 Theorie 1 Vertragstheorie 1 contractual and informational externalities 1 exogenous and endogenous private information 1 mechanism design, optimal disclosure policy 1 sequential common agency 1
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Online availability
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Free 2 Undetermined 1
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 2 Article 1
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Working Paper 1
Language
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English 2 Undetermined 1
Author
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Calzolari, Giacomo 1 Figueroa, Nicols 1 Pavan, Alessandro 1 Pfiffelmann, Marie 1 Skreta, Vasiliki 1
Institution
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Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion (LaRGE), Institut de Finance de Strasbourg 1
Published in...
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Discussion Paper 1 Economics Letters 1 Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 1
Source
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RePEc 2 EconStor 1
Showing 1 - 3 of 3
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Which Optimal Design For LLDAs?
Pfiffelmann, Marie - Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion (LaRGE), Institut … - 2006
Lottery-linked deposit accounts are financial assets that provide an interest rate determined by a lottery. The aim of this study is to determine the optimal design of these financial assets (under cumulative prospect theory (CPT) framework). We underline that the weighting functions usually...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005811656
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On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
Calzolari, Giacomo; Pavan, Alessandro - 2004
This paper considers an environment where two principals sequentially contract with a common agent and studies the exchange of information between the two bilateral relationships. We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the decisions taken by the downstream...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266292
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A note on optimal allocation mechanisms
Figueroa, Nicols; Skreta, Vasiliki - In: Economics Letters 102 (2009) 3, pp. 169-173
When the buyer's utility is non-linear in type, revenue-maximizing mechanisms for multiple goods may be random. This happens when the allocation rule obtained via pointwise optimization is not incentive compatible, which is possible even with strictly increasing virtual utilities.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005269750
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