Despite the distinctive character of the Austrian approach to "microfoundations for macroeconomics", the literature on free banking contains a number of arguments which make use of game-theoretic concepts and models such as the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma model. While there can be no general a...

We consider a principal-agent model where the agent is a taxpayer and the principal is a tax authority. The principal wants to know the agent’s private information (e.g. emission or income) so that she can then assign a tax to the agent. It is mandatory for the taxpayer to report his...

A monopolist seller faces potential buyers whose payoffs depend on their relevant unknown states and independently private types. The seller can disclose without observing information about the states. With post-signal participation constraint, simple disclosure policies such as full or no...

We study a setting in which a mechanism designer must choose the appropriate social alternative depending on the state of nature. We study the problem of optimal design and demonstrate that a mechanism that allocates the social optimum and assigns payments equal to the posterior expected utility...

We propose a new market design for trading financial assets. The design has three elements: (1) traders may place orders for any user-defined linear combination of assets,with arbitrary positive and negativeweights; (2) orders are downwardsloping piecewise-linear demand curves with quantities...