We study a classic mechanism design problem: How to organize trade between two privately informed parties. We characterize an optimal mechanism under selfish preferences and present experimental evidence that, under such a mechanism, a non-negligible fraction of individuals deviates from the...

Popper’s (1967) ’piecemeal social change’ is an approach manifesting itself in science as critical and emancipatory (C&E) research. It is concerned with incrementally removing manifested inequalities to achieve a ’better’ world. Although design science research in information systems...

Most empirical accounts of design suggest that designing is an activity where objects and representations are progressively constructed. Despite this fact, whether design is a constructive process or not is not a question directly addressed in the current design research. By contrast, in other...

This contribution revisits the problem of allocating R&D subsidies by government agencies. Typically, the applicants' financial constraints are private information. The literature has recommended the use of auctions in order to reduce information rents and thus improve the efficiency of how...

This paper focuses on implementation issues in environments where it may be costly for the players to send certain messages. We develop an approach allowing to characterize the set of implementable outcomes in such environments, and then apply it to derive optimal mechanisms. The key elements of...

I provide a brief introduction to the early literatures on Matching, Auctions, and Market Design.The design of matching markets and auctions has brought economic theory and practice together. Indeed, this is an area where microeconomic theory has had its largest direct impact. This is in part...