1. Introduction -- 2. Basics of Economic Theory of Contract -- 3. Economics of Damage Remedies I: Unilateral Reliance, One-Sided Information Asymmetry -- 4. Economics of Damage Remedies II: Bilateral Reliance, One-Sided Information Asymmetry -- 5. Economics of Damage Remedies III: Incentives...

Market fragmentation : monitoring and history -- Smart order routing -- Tick size; -- Information seeking and price discovery -- Dark pools and broker crossing networks -- Liquidity : the viewpoint of trading venues -- The agenda of high frequency traders -- The link between fragmentation and...

"This book provides the design of new products, redesign of existing products with different materials improving properties, optimized product design, alternative design methodology for betterment, redesign of mechanical equipment and products with alternative parts enhancing performance"--

Global warming caused by accumulation of emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) is a public bad, addressing which requires collective action by all the countries of the world. Under the United Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), most countries have negotiated the Kyoto Protocol for GHG...

We examine how teams working on radical innovation develop a novel type of absorptive capacity (AC) to make use of external knowledge. In the setting of the semiconductor industry we compare AC in incremental innovation and AC in radical innovation, relying on the most recent theory of design...

Purpose - Scholars and practitioners have both emphasized the importance of collaboration in innovation context. They have also largely acknowledged that the definition of common purpose is a major driver of successful collaboration, but surprisingly, researchers have put little effort into...

We propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision. In addition to individual incentive compatibility, we impose conditions of robust implementability and coalition proofness. Under these additional conditions, participants' contributions can only depend on the level of...

I study the consistency of incentive compatibility with several stability notions for a one-to-one matching market with transfers. Ex post stability, studied in the matching literature, is too strong to be satisfi ed together with incentive compatibility. Therefore, I introduce weaker stability...

This mechanism design paper studies the assignment of people to projects over time. Inability to communicate interim shocks is a force for long-term assignments, though exceptions exist for high risk aversion. In contrast, costless reporting of interim shocks makes switching powerful for...