We derive the optimal funding mechanism to incentivize development and production of vaccines against diseases with epidemic potential. In the model, suppliers' costs are private information and investments are noncontractible, precluding cost-reimbursement contracts, requiring fixed-price...

Shortages in organs for transplantation have resulted in a renewed interest in designing incentive policies to promote organ supply. The donor‐priority rule, which grants priority for transplantation based on deceased organ donor registration status, has proven to be effective in both theory...

We propose a new market design for trading financial assets. The design combines three elements: (1) Orders are downward-sloping linear demand curves with quantities expressed as flows; (2) Markets clear in discrete time using uniform-price batch auctions; (3) Traders may submit orders for...

In recent years, in the markets for residency and fellowship positions at hospitals in the US, many market participants have expressed discontent with the process through which interviews are determined. In this paper, I show that matching with interviews is a special case of matching with...

The notion of envy-freeness is a natural and intuitive fairness requirement in resource allocation. With indivisible goods, such fair allocations are unfortunately not guaranteed to exist. Classical works have avoided this issue by introducing an additional divisible resource, i.e., money, to...

Classical Bayesian mechanism design relies on the common prior assumption, but the common prior is often not available in practice. We study the design of prior-independent mechanisms that relax this assumption: the seller is selling an indivisible item to n buyers such that the buyers’...