We propose a political economy mechanism that explains the presence of fiscal regimes punctuated by crisis periods. Our model focuses on the interaction between successive deficit-biased governments subject to i.i.d. fiscal shocks. We show that the economy transitions between a fiscally...

A principal who values an object allocates it to one or more agents. Agents learn private information (signals) from an information designer about the allocation payoff to the principal. Monetary transfer is not available but the principal can costly verify agents' private signals. The...

Motivated by online decision-making in time-varying combinatorial environments, we study the problem of transforming offline algorithms to their online counterparts. We focus on offline combinatorial problems that are amenable to a constant factor approximation using a greedy algorithm that is...

We study the welfare produced by a coordinated school assignment system that is based exclusively on minimizing distance to schools, comparing the matches it produces to a system that includes household preferences using a deferred acceptance algorithm. We leverage administrative data and a...

Refugee relocation in the European Union relies on mandatory quotas, which assign a fixed share of migrants to each member state. Mandatory quotas have been severely opposed by some national governments for ignoring their preferences on asylum policy. This paper introduces a new mechanism that...