A well-known result in incentive theory is that for a very broad class of decision problems, there is no mechanism which achieves truth-telling in dominant strategies, efficiency and budget balancedness (or first best implementability). On the contrary, Mitra and Sen (1998), prove that linear...

This paper examines the implementability of social choice functions when only partial verification of private information is possible. Green and Laffont (1986) used this framework to derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the revelation principle to continue to hold with partial...

This is the first of two papers in which the design theories underlining the work of contemporary European and Japanese fashion designers are explored. In this paper, four general, major influential factors are discussed; specifically, the historical factor, the aesthetic factor, the cultural...

This chapter describes methods for solving simple versions that arise in nonlinear pricing and mechanism design. Nonlinear pricing is one instance of a wide variety of problems derived from the principalagent paradigm and its extensions to mechanism design. The key ingredient of the standard...