We conduct laboratory experiments for the Vickrey auction with and without an announcement on strategy-proofness to subjects. Although the rate of truth-telling among the subjects stays at 20% without the announcement, it increases to 47% with the announcement. Moreover, by conducting...

We analyze the problem of a buyer who chooses a supplier for a long-term relationship via an auction. The buyer lacks commitment to not renegotiate the terms of the contract in the long run. Thus, suppliers are cautious about the information revealed during the auction. We show theoretically and...

In electricity markets around the world, the substantial increase of intermittent renewable electricity generation has intensified concerns about generation adequacy, ultimately driving the implementation of capacity remuneration mechanisms. Although formally technology-neutral, substantial...

Extensive evidence suggests that participants in the direct student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanism (DSPDA) play dominated strategies. In particular, students with low priority tend to misrepresent their preferences for popular schools. To explain the observed data, we introduce...

Auctions are widely used to determine the remuneration for renewable energies. They typically induce a high concentration of renewable energy plants at very productive sites far-off the main load centres, leading to an inefficient allocation as transmission line capacities are restricted but not...

Kurz vor seiner entscheidenden Sitzung steht das Klimakabinett vor großen Herausforderungen: Die Preise für Energieträger sind uneinheitlich, die Treibhausgasemissionen sind zu hoch und Deutschland verfehlt mindestens seine kurzfristigen Klimaziele. Was muss passieren, damit sich...

This paper studies an inventory management problem faced by an upstream supplier who is in a collaborative agreement, such as vendor managed inventory (VMI), with a retailer. A VMI partnership provides the supplier an opportunity to manage inventory for the supply chain, in exchange for...

We consider a standard social choice environment with linear utilities and independent, one-dimensional, private types. We prove that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists an equivalent dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism that delivers the same interim...