We will call a game a reachable (pure strategy) equilibria game if starting from any strategy by any player, by a sequence of best-response moves we are able to reach a (pure strategy) equilibrium. We give a characterization of all finite strategy space duopolies with reachable equilibria. We...

We consider a discrete choice model in which the payoffs to each of an agentʼs n actions are subjected to the average of m i.i.d. shocks, and use tools from large deviations theory to characterize the rate of decay of the probability of choosing a given suboptimal action as m approaches...

Customer choice behavior, such as 'buy-up' and 'buy-down', is an important phe-nomenon in a wide range of industries. Yet there are few models or methodologies available to exploit this phenomenon within yield management systems. We make some progress on filling this void. Specifically, we...

Customer choice behavior, such as buy-up and buy-down, is an important phenomenon in a wide range of revenue management contexts. Yet most revenue management methodologies ignore this phenomenon---or at best approximate it in a heuristic way. In this paper, we provide an exact and quite general...