In this paper, the authors investigate judgment aggregation by assuming that some formulas of the agenda are singled out as premisses, and the Independence condition (formula-wise aggregation) holds for them, though perhaps not for others.

All existing impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation over logically connected propositions have one of two restrictions: they either use a controversial systematicity condition or apply only to special agendas of propositions with rich logical connections. An important open question is...

Within social choice theory, the new field of judgment aggregation aims to merge many individual sets of judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a single collective set of judgments on these propositions. Commonly, judgment aggregation is studied using standard propositional...

In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgements on logically connected propositions into collective judgements, it is often asked whether judgement aggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue the opposite. After proving a general...

In the theory of judgment aggregation on connected propositions, an important question remains open: Which aggregation rules are manipulable and which are strategy-proof? We define manipulability and strategy- proofness in judgment aggregation, characterize all strategy-proof aggregation rules,...

In two recent papers, Christian List and Philip Pettit have argued that there is a problem in the aggregation of reasoned judgements that is akin to the aggregation of the preference problem in social choice theory.1 Indeed, List and Pettit prove a new general impossibility theorem for the...