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  • Search: subject:"Dominant Strategies"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Common knowledge 5 Dominant strategies 5 Interim equilibrium 5 Mechanism design 5 dominant strategies 5 Dominant Strategies 3 Implementation 3 Robustness 3 Universal type space 3 coordination games 3 payoff-dominance 3 tail events 3 Common Knowledge 2 Ex-post equilibrium 2 Interim Equilibrium 2 Mechanism Design 2 nonexistence of equilibrium 2 Domain Restrictions 1 Ex post equilibrium 1 Ex-post Equilibrium 1 Full implementation 1 Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem 1 Gleichgewicht 1 Iterative Deletion 1 Koordination 1 Nichtkooperatives Spiel 1 Partial implementation 1 Rationalizability 1 Robust implementation 1 Robust mechanism design 1 Social Choice 1 Spieltheorie 1 Strategy-proofness 1 Theorie 1 Universal Type Space 1 Voting 1 common-value second-price auctions 1 differential information 1 implementation in dominant strategies 1 information advantage 1
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Online availability
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Free 14
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 14
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Working Paper 1
Language
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English 9 Undetermined 5
Author
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Bergemann, Dirk 7 Morris, Stephen 7 Voorneveld, Mark 2 Barberà, Salvador 1 Borgers, Tilman 1 EINY, Ezra 1 HAIMANKO, Ori 1 Mishra, Debasis 1 ORZACH, Ram 1 Quadir, Abdul 1 SELA, Aner 1 Smith, Doug 1 Voorneveld, M. 1
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Institution
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Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 6 Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain 1 Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona 1 Economics Institute for Research (SIR), Handelshögskolan i Stockholm 1 Indian Statistical Institute 1 School of Management, Yale University 1 Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1 Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 1
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Published in...
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Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 6 SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 2 CORE Discussion Papers 1 Discussion Paper / Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1 Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 1 MPRA Paper 1 UFAE and IAE Working Papers 1 Yale School of Management Working Papers 1
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Source
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RePEc 13 EconStor 1
Showing 1 - 10 of 14
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Deterministic single object auctions with private values
Mishra, Debasis; Quadir, Abdul - Indian Statistical Institute - 2012
rule is implementable (in dominant strategies) if and only if it is a generalized utility maximizer. With a mild continuity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706353
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Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules
Borgers, Tilman; Smith, Doug - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
We develop an analysis of voting rules that is robust in the sense that we do not make any assumption regarding voters’ knowledge about each other. In dominant strategy voting rules, voters’ behavior can be predicted uniquely without making any such assumption. However, on full domains, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009652034
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Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2011
This essay is the introduction for a collection of papers by the two of us on "Robust Mechanism Design" to be published by World Scientific Publishing. The appendix of this essay lists the chapters of the book. The objective of this introductory essay is to provide the reader with an overview of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009251220
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Strategy-proof social choice
Barberà, Salvador - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2010
This paper surveys the literature on strategy-proofness from a historical perspective. While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is on social choice models. This article has been prepared for the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008584608
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Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2008
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation. Robust monotonicity is strictly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087384
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Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2008
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation. Robust monotonicity is strictly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008545755
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The possibility of impossible stairways and greener grass
Voorneveld, Mark - 2007
In classical game theory, players have finitely many actions and evaluate outcomes of mixed strategies using a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Allowing a larger, but countable, player set introduces a host of phenomena that are impossible in finite games. Firstly, in coordination...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281392
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The Possibility of Impossible Stairways and Greener Grass
Voorneveld, M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2007
In classical game theory, players have finitely many actions and evaluate outcomes of mixed strategies using a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Allowing a larger, but countable, player set introduces a host of phenomena that are impossible in finite games. Firstly, in coordination...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092093
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The possibility of impossible stairways and greener grass
Voorneveld, Mark - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2007
recommended course of action in terms of dominant strategies or payo -dominance may be diametrically opposed, even if everybody … would rather switch to its complement. Once there, they’d rather switch back. Keywords: coordination games, dominant … strategies, payo -dominance, nonexistence of equi- librium, tail events. JEL classification: C72 SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005190860
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Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2005
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with a social choice function. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation. Robust...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593322
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