Experimentalists researching individual time-preference behavior report that hyperbolic discounting explains their results better than exponential discounting. Financial institutions almost exclusively employ exponential discounting, so these results expose a rift in thought between financial...

We study the role of expectations of naive agents in a general equilibrium version of the Ramsey model with quasi-hyperbolic discounting. When agents recognize others' naivete, as strongly suggested by empirical evidence, they revise consumption paths, correctly anticipating prices in a...

We study how timing assumption matters for the commitment problem and time inconsistency in search models with unemployment insurance. We analyze the Markov equilibrium without commitment and the Ramsey policy with commitment under two different timings. The first timing is where consumption...

We study the implications of the Fed's new policy framework of average inflation targeting (AIT) and its ambiguous communication. The central bank has the incentive to deviate from its announced AIT and implement inflation targeting ex post to maximize social welfare. We show two motives for...

Considering that the assumption of time consistency does not adequately reveal the mechanisms of exit decisions of venture capital (VC), this study proposes two kinds of time-inconsistent preferences (i.e., time-flow inconsistency and time-point inconsistency) to advance research in this field....

Households regularly fail to make optimal financial decisions. But what are the underlying reasons for this? Using two conceptually distinct measures of time inconsistency based on bank account transaction data and behavioral measurement experiments, we show that the excessive use of bank...

Inconsistency in consumer time preferences has been well-established and used to explain seemingly short-sighted behaviors (e.g., failures of self-control). However, prior research has conflated time-inconsistent preferences (discount rates that vary over time) with present bias (greater...

We consider a Stackelberg game in discrete time where a manager (leader) hires an agent (follower) for the completion of a project. The project has two states: either uncompleted or completed. The manager gets a fixed reward upon the completion of the project. At the beginning of each stage...